There is no belief update bias for neutral events: failure to replicate Burton et al. (2022).

In a recent paper, Burton et al. claim that individuals update beliefs to a greater extent when learning an event is less likely compared to more likely than expected. Here, we investigate Burton's et al.'s, findings. First, we show how Burton et al.'s data do not in fact support a belief update bias for neutral events. Next, in an attempt to replicate their findings, we collect a new data set employing the original belief update task design, but with neutral events. A belief update bias for neutral events is not observed. Finally, we highlight the statistical errors and confounds in Burton et al.'s design and analysis. This includes mis-specifying a reinforcement learning approach to model the data and failing to follow standard computational model fitting sanity checks such as parameter recovery, model comparison and out of sample prediction. Together, the results find little evidence for biased updating for neutral events.

Multifaceted information-seeking motives in children.

From an early age, children need to gather information to learn about their environment. Deciding which knowledge to pursue can be difficult because information can serve several, sometimes competing, purposes. Here, we examine the developmental trajectories of such diverse information-seeking motives. Over five experiments involving 521 children (aged 4-12), we find that school-age children integrate three key factors into their information-seeking choices: whether information reduces uncertainty, is useful in directing action, and is likely to be positive. Choices that likely reveal positive information and are useful for action emerge as early as age 4, followed by choices that reduce uncertainty (at ~age 5). Our results suggest that motives related to usefulness and uncertainty reduction become stronger with age, while the tendency to seek positive news does not show a statistically significant change throughout development. This study reveals how the relative importance of diverging, sometimes conflicting, information-seeking motives emerges throughout development.

Changing the incentive structure of social media platforms to halt the spread of misinformation.

The powerful allure of social media platforms has been attributed to the human need for social rewards. Here, we demonstrate that the spread of misinformation on such platforms is facilitated by existing social 'carrots' (e.g., 'likes') and 'sticks' (e.g., 'dislikes') that are dissociated from the veracity of the information shared. Testing 951 participants over six experiments, we show that a slight change to the incentive structure of social media platforms, such that social rewards and punishments are contingent on information veracity, produces a considerable increase in the discernment of shared information. Namely, an increase in the proportion of true information shared relative to the proportion of false information shared. Computational modeling (i.e., drift-diffusion models) revealed the underlying mechanism of this effect is associated with an increase in the weight participants assign to evidence consistent with discerning behavior. The results offer evidence for an intervention that could be adopted to reduce misinformation spread, which in turn could reduce violence, vaccine hesitancy and political polarization, without reducing engagement.

In recent years, the amount of untrue information, or 'misinformation', shared online has increased rapidly. This can have profound effects on society and has been linked to violence, political extremism, and resistance to climate action. One reason for the spread of misinformation is the lack of incentives for users to share true content and avoid sharing false content. People tend to select actions that they believe will lead to positive feedback ('carrots') and try to avoid actions that lead to negative feedback ('sticks'). On most social media sites, these carrots and sticks come in the form of 'like' and 'dislike' reactions, respectively. Stories that users think will attract 'likes' are most likely to be shared with other users. However, because the number of likes a post receives is not representative of how accurate it is, users share information even if they suspect it may not be accurate. As a result, misinformation can spread rapidly. Measures aimed at slowing the spread of misinformation have been introduced to some social media sites, such as removing a few virulent spreaders of falsities and flagging misleading content. However, measures that change the incentive structure of sites so that positive and negative feedback is based on the trustworthiness of the information have not yet been explored. To test this approach, Globig et al. set up a simulated social media site that included 'trust' and 'distrust' buttons, as well as the usual 'like' and 'dislike' options. The site featured up to one hundred news stories, half of which were untrue. More than 900 participants viewed the news posts and could react using the new buttons as well as repost the stories. The experiment showed that participants used the 'trust' and 'distrust' buttons to differentiate between true and false posts more than the other options. As a result, to receive more 'trust' responses and less 'distrust' responses from other users, participants were more likely to repost true stories than false ones. This led to a large reduction in the amount of misinformation being spread. Computational modeling revealed that the participants were paying more attention to how reliable a news story appeared to be when deciding whether to repost it. Globig et al. showed that adding buttons to highlight the trustworthiness of posts on social media sites reduces the spread of misinformation, without reducing user engagement. This measure could be easily incorporated into existing social media sites and could have a positive impact on issues that are often fuelled by misinformation, such as vaccine hesitancy and resistance to climate action.

The illusory truth effect leads to the spread of misinformation.

Misinformation can negatively impact people's lives in domains ranging from health to politics. An important research goal is to understand how misinformation spreads in order to curb it. Here, we test whether and how a single repetition of misinformation fuels its spread. Over two experiments (N = 260) participants indicated which statements they would like to share with other participants on social media. Half of the statements were repeated and half were new. The results reveal that participants were more likely to share statements they had previously been exposed to. Importantly, the relationship between repetition and sharing was mediated by perceived accuracy. That is, repetition of misinformation biased people's judgment of accuracy and as a result fuelled the spread of misinformation. The effect was observed in the domain of health (Exp 1) and general knowledge (Exp 2), suggesting it is not tied to a specific domain.

Why and When Beliefs Change.

Why people do or do not change their beliefs has been a long-standing puzzle. Sometimes people hold onto false beliefs despite ample contradictory evidence; sometimes they change their beliefs without sufficient reason. Here, we propose that the utility of a belief is derived from the potential outcomes associated with holding it. Outcomes can be internal (e.g., positive/negative feelings) or external (e.g., material gain/loss), and only some are dependent on belief accuracy. Belief change can then be understood as an economic transaction in which the multidimensional utility of the old belief is compared against that of the new belief. Change will occur when potential outcomes alter across attributes, for example because of changing environments or when certain outcomes are made more or less salient.

Sensitivity to intrinsic rewards is domain general and related to mental health.

Humans frequently engage in intrinsically rewarding activities (for example, consuming art, reading). Despite such activities seeming diverse, we show that sensitivity to intrinsic rewards is domain general and associated with mental health. In this cross-sectional study, participants online (N = 483) were presented with putative visual, cognitive and social intrinsic rewards as well as monetary rewards and neutral stimuli. All rewards elicited positive feelings (were 'liked'), generated consummatory behaviour (were 'wanted') and increased the likelihood of the action leading to them (were 'reinforcing'). Factor analysis revealed that ~40% of response variance across stimuli was explained by a general sensitivity to all rewards, but not to neutral stimuli. Affective aspects of mental health were associated with sensitivity to intrinsic, but not monetary, rewards. These results may help explain thriving and suffering: individuals with high reward sensitivity will engage in a variety of intrinsically rewarding activities, eventually finding those they excel at, whereas low sensitivity individuals will not.

Evaluation of Early Ketamine Effects on Belief-Updating Biases in Patients With Treatment-Resistant Depression.

Importance: Clinical research has shown that persistent negative beliefs maintain depression and that subanesthetic ketamine infusions induce rapid antidepressant responses. Objective: To evaluate whether ketamine alters belief updating and how such cognitive effects are associated with the clinical effects of ketamine. Design, Setting, and Participants: This study used an observational case-control protocol with a mixed-effects design that nested 2 groups by 2 testing time points. Observers were not blinded. Patients with treatment-resistant depression (TRD) and healthy volunteer participants aged 34 to 68 years were included. Patients with TRD were diagnosed with major depressive disorder or bipolar depression, had a Montgomery-Åsberg Depression Rating Scale score greater than 20, a Maudsley Staging Method score greater than 7, and failed to respond to at least 2 prior antidepressant trials. Exclusion criteria were any other psychiatric, neurological, or neurosurgical comorbidities, substance use or addictive disorders, and recreational ketamine consumption. Data were collected from January to February 2019 and from May to December 2019, and data were analyzed from January 2020 to July 2021. Exposures: Patients with TRD were observed 24 hours before single ketamine infusion, 4 hours after the infusion, and 4 hours after the third infusion, which was 1 week after the first infusion. Healthy control participants were observed twice 1 week apart without ketamine exposure. Main Outcomes and Measures: Montgomery-Åsberg Depression Rating Scale score and belief updating after belief updating when patients received good news and bad news measured by a cognitive belief-updating task and mathematically formalized by a computational reinforcement learning model. Results: Of 56 included participants, 29 (52%) were male, and the mean (SEM) age was 52.3 (1.2) years. A total of 26 patients with TRD and 30 control participants were included. A significant group × testing time point × news valence interaction showed that patients with TRD updated their beliefs more after good than bad news following a single ketamine infusion (controlled for age and education: ß = -0.91; 95% CI, -1.58 to -0.24; t216 = -2.67; P = .008) than controls. Computational modeling showed that this effect was associated with asymmetrical learning rates (LRs) after ketamine treatment (good news LRs after ketamine, 0.51 [SEM, 0.04]; bad news LRs after ketamine 0.36 [SEM, 0.03], t25 = 3.8; P < .001) and partially mediated early antidepressant responses (path a*b: ß = -1.00 [SEM, 0.66]; t26 = -1.53; z = -1.98; P = .04). Conclusions and Relevance: These findings provide novel insights into the cognitive mechanisms of the action of ketamine in patients with TRD, with promising perspectives for augmented psychotherapy for individuals with mood disorders.

Quantifying the heritability of belief formation.

Individual differences in behaviour, traits and mental-health are partially heritable. Traditionally, studies have focused on quantifying the heritability of high-order characteristics, such as happiness or education attainment. Here, we quantify the degree of heritability of lower-level mental processes that likely contribute to complex traits and behaviour. In particular, we quantify the degree of heritability of cognitive and affective factors that contribute to the generation of beliefs about risk, which drive behavior in domains ranging from finance to health. Monozygotic and dizygotic twin pairs completed a belief formation task. We first show that beliefs about risk are associated with vividness of imagination, affective evaluation and learning abilities. We then demonstrate that the genetic contribution to individual differences in these processes range between 13.5 and 39%, with affect evaluation showing a particular robust heritability component. These results provide clues to which mental factors may be driving the heritability component of beliefs formation, which in turn contribute to the heritability of complex traits.

Observing others give & take: A computational account of bystanders' feelings and actions.

Social interactions influence people's feelings and behavior. Here, we propose that a person's well-being is influenced not only by interactions they experience themselves, but also by those they observe. In particular, we test and quantify the influence of observed selfishness and observed inequality on a bystanders' feelings and non-costly punishment decisions. We developed computational models that relate others' (un)selfish acts to observers' emotional reactions and punishment decisions. These characterize the rules by which others' interactions are transformed into bystanders' reactions, and successfully predict those reactions in out-of-sample participants. The models highlight the impact of two social values-'selfishness aversion' and 'inequality aversion'. As for the latter we find that even small violations from perfect equality have a disproportionately large impact on feelings and punishment. In this age of internet and social media we constantly observe others' online interactions, in addition to in-person interactions. Quantifying the consequences of such observations is important for predicting their impact on society.

Anxiety increases information-seeking in response to large changes.

Seeking information when anxious may help reduce the aversive feeling of uncertainty and guide decision-making. If information is negative or confusing, however, this may increase anxiety further. Information gathered under anxiety can thus be beneficial and/or damaging. Here, we examine whether anxiety leads to a general increase in information-seeking, or rather to changes in the type of information and/or situations in which it is sought. In two controlled laboratory studies, we show that both trait anxiety and induced anxiety lead to a selective alteration in information-seeking. In particular, anxiety did not enhance the general tendency to seek information, nor did it alter the valence of the information gathered. Rather, anxiety amplified the tendency to seek information more in response to large changes in the environment. This was true even when the cause of the anxiety was not directly related to the information sought. As anxious individuals have been shown to have problems learning in changing environments, greater information-seeking in such environments may be an adaptive compensatory mechanism.

Perceptions of personal and public risk: Dissociable effects on behavior and well-being.

When faced with a global threat peoples' perception of risk guides their response. When danger is to the self as well as to others two risk estimates are generated-to the self and to others. Here, we set out to examine how people's perceptions of health risk to the self and others are related to their psychological well-being and behavioral response. To that end, we surveyed a large representative sample of Americans facing the COVID-19 pandemic at two times (N1 = 1145, N2 = 683). We found that people perceived their own risk to be relatively low, while estimating the risk to others as relatively high. These risk estimates were differentially associated with psychological well-being and behavior. In particular, perceived personal but not public risk was associated with people's happiness, while both were predictive of anxiety. In contrast, the tendency to engage in protective behaviors were predicted by peoples' estimated risk to the population, but not to themselves. This raises the possibility that people were predominantly engaging in protective behaviors for the benefit of others. The findings can inform public policy aimed at protecting people's psychological well-being and physical health during global threats. Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11166-022-09373-0.

Individual differences in information-seeking.

Vast amounts of personalized information are now available to individuals. A vital research challenge is to establish how people decide what information they wish to obtain. Here, over five studies examining information-seeking in different domains we show that information-seeking is associated with three diverse motives. Specifically, we find that participants assess whether information is useful in directing action, how it will make them feel, and whether it relates to concepts they think of often. We demonstrate that participants integrate these assessments into a calculation of the value of information that explains information seeking or its avoidance. Different individuals assign different weights to these three factors when seeking information. Using a longitudinal approach, we find that the relative weights assigned to these information-seeking motives within an individual show stability over time, and are related to mental health as assessed using a battery of psychopathology questionnaires.

Under Threat, Weaker Evidence Is Required to Reach Undesirable Conclusions.

Critical decisions, such as in domains ranging from medicine to finance, are often made under threatening circumstances that elicit stress and anxiety. The negative effects of such reactions on learning and decision-making have been repeatedly underscored. In contrast, here we show that perceived threat alters the process by which evidence is accumulated in a way that may be adaptive. Participants (n = 91) completed a sequential evidence sampling task in which they were incentivized to accurately judge whether they were in a desirable state, which was associated with greater rewards than losses, or an undesirable state, which was associated with greater losses than rewards. Before the task participants in the "threat group" experienced a social-threat manipulation. Results show that perceived threat led to a reduction in the strength of evidence required to reach an undesirable judgment. Computational modeling revealed this was because of an increase in the relative rate by which negative information was accumulated. The effect of the threat manipulation was global, as the alteration to evidence accumulation was observed for information which was not directly related to the cause of the threat. Requiring weaker evidence to reach undesirable conclusions in threatening environments may be adaptive as it can lead to increased precautionary action.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT To make good judgments, people gather information. As information is often unlimited, a decision has to be made as to when the data are sufficiently strong to reach a conclusion. Here, we show that this decision is significantly influenced by perceived threat. In particular, under threat, the rate of negative information accumulation increased, such that weaker evidence was required to reach an undesirable conclusion. Such modulation could be adaptive as it can result in enhanced cautious behavior in dangerous environments.

A selective effect of dopamine on information-seeking.

Humans are motivated to seek information from their environment. How the brain motivates this behavior is unknown. One speculation is that the brain employs neuromodulatory systems implicated in primary reward-seeking, in particular dopamine, to instruct information-seeking. However, there has been no causal test for the role of dopamine in information-seeking. Here, we show that administration of a drug that enhances dopamine function (dihydroxy-L-phenylalanine; L-DOPA) reduces the impact of valence on information-seeking. Specifically, while participants under Placebo sought more information about potential gains than losses, under L-DOPA this difference was not observed. The results provide new insight into the neurobiology of information-seeking and generates the prediction that abnormal dopaminergic function (such as in Parkinson's disease) will result in valence-dependent changes to information-seeking.

Belief updating in bipolar disorder predicts time of recurrence.

Bipolar disorder is a chronic relapsing condition in which mood episodes are interspersed with periods of wellbeing (euthymia). Shorter periods of euthymia are associated with poorer functioning, so it is crucial to identify predictors of relapse to facilitate treatment. Here, we test the hypothesis that specific valence-dependent learning patterns emerge prior to the clinical manifestation of a relapse, predicting its timing. The ability to update beliefs in response to positive and negative information was quantified in bipolar patients during euthymia, who were then monitored for 5 years. We found that reduced tendency to update beliefs in response to positive relative to negative information predicted earlier relapse. Less updating in response to positive information may generate pessimistic beliefs, which in turn can lead to more severe prodromal symptoms (e.g. sleep disturbance, irritability etc.). The results suggest that measuring valence-dependent belief updating could facilitate risk prediction in bipolar disorder.

The motivational cost of inequality: Opportunity gaps reduce the willingness to work.

Factors beyond a person's control, such as demographic characteristics at birth, often influence the availability of rewards an individual can expect for their efforts. We know surprisingly little how such differences in opportunities impact human motivation. To test this, we designed a study in which we arbitrarily varied the reward offered to each participant in a group for performing the same task. Participants then had to decide whether or not they were willing to exert effort to receive their reward. Across three experiments, we found that the unequal distribution of offers reduced participants' motivation to pursue rewards even when their relative position in the distribution was high, and despite the decision being of no benefit to others and reducing the reward for oneself. Participants' feelings partially mediated this relationship. In particular, a large disparity in rewards was associated with greater unhappiness, which was associated with lower willingness to work-even when controlling for absolute reward and its relative value, both of which also affected decisions to work. A model that incorporated a person's relative position and unfairness of rewards in the group fit better to the data than other popular models describing the effects of inequality. Our findings suggest opportunity-gaps can trigger psychological dynamics that hurt productivity and well-being of all involved.

The Value of Beliefs.

We construct our beliefs to meet two sometimes conflicting goals: forming accurate beliefs to inform our decisions and forming desirable beliefs that we value for their own sake. In this NeuroView, we consider emerging neuroscience evidence on how the brain motivates itself to form particular beliefs and why it does so.

How people decide what they want to know.

Immense amounts of information are now accessible to people, including information that bears on their past, present and future. An important research challenge is to determine how people decide to seek or avoid information. Here we propose a framework of information-seeking that aims to integrate the diverse motives that drive information-seeking and its avoidance. Our framework rests on the idea that information can alter people's action, affect and cognition in both positive and negative ways. The suggestion is that people assess these influences and integrate them into a calculation of the value of information that leads to information-seeking or avoidance. The theory offers a framework for characterizing and quantifying individual differences in information-seeking, which we hypothesize may also be diagnostic of mental health. We consider biases that can lead to both insufficient and excessive information-seeking. We also discuss how the framework can help government agencies to assess the welfare effects of mandatory information disclosure.

Confirmation bias in the utilization of others' opinion strength.

Humans tend to discount information that undermines past choices and judgments. This confirmation bias has significant impact on domains ranging from politics to science and education. Little is known about the mechanisms underlying this fundamental characteristic of belief formation. Here we report a mechanism underlying the confirmation bias. Specifically, we provide evidence for a failure to use the strength of others' disconfirming opinions to alter confidence in judgments, but adequate use when opinions are confirmatory. This bias is related to reduced neural sensitivity to the strength of others' opinions in the posterior medial prefrontal cortex when opinions are disconfirming. Our results demonstrate that existing judgments alter the neural representation of information strength, leaving the individual less likely to alter opinions in the face of disagreement.